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Abstract: Public opinion is shaped by online content, spread via social media and curated 
algorithmically. The current online ecosystem has been designed predominantly to capture user 
attention rather than promote deliberate cognition and autonomous choice. The resultant 
information overload, finely tuned personalization, and distorted social cues, in turn, pave the 
way for manipulation and the spread of false information. How can transparency and autonomy 20 
be promoted instead thus fostering the positive potential of the Web? Effective Web governance 
informed by behavioural research is critically needed to empower individuals online. We identify 
technologically available yet largely untapped cues that can be harnessed to indicate the 
epistemic quality of online content, the factors underlying algorithmic decisions and the degree 
of consensus in online debates. We then map out two classes of behavioural interventions—25 
nudging and boosting— that enlist these cues to redesign online environments for informed and 
autonomous choice and democratic discourse.  
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 To the extent that a “wealth of information creates a poverty of attention” (p. 41)1, people 
have never been as cognitively impoverished as they are today. Major Web platforms such as 40 
Google and Facebook serve as hubs, distributors, and curators2; their algorithms are 
indispensable for navigating the vast digital landscape and for enabling bottom-up participation 
in the production and distribution of information. Big Tech exploits this all-important role in 
pursuit of the most precious resource in the online marketplace: human attention. Employing 
algorithms that learn people's behavioural patterns4,5,6,7, technology companies target their users 45 
with advertisements and design users’ information and choice environments8. The relationship 
between platforms and people is profoundly asymmetric: Platforms have deep knowledge of 
users’ behaviour, whereas users know little about how their data is collected, how it is exploited 
for commercial or political purposes, and how it and the data of others are used to shape their 
online experience. These asymmetries in Big Tech’s business model have created an opaque 50 
information ecology that undermines not only user autonomy but also the transparent exchange 
on which democratic societies are built9,10.  Several problematic social phenomena pervade the 
Internet, such as the spread of false information11,12,13,14,15—which includes disinformation 
(intentionally fabricated falsehoods) and misinformation (falsehoods created without intent, e.g., 
poorly researched content or biased reporting)—or attitudinal and emotional polarization16,17 55 
(e.g., polarization of elites18, partisan sorting19, and polarization along controversial topics20,21). 
We argue that the behavioural sciences should play a key role in informing and designing 
systematic responses to such threats. The role of behavioural science is not only to advance 
active scientific debates on the causes and reach of false information22,23,24,25,26 or whether mass 
polarization is increasing27,28,29; it is also to find new ways to promote the Internet’s potential to 60 









change to the coronavirus pandemic—require coordinated collective solutions, making a 
democratically interconnected world crucial31. 
Why Behavioural Sciences Are Crucial for Shaping the Online Ecosystem 
More than any traditional media, online media permit and encourage active behaviours32 70 
such as information search, interaction, and choice. These behaviours are highly contingent on 
environmental and social structures and cues33. Even seemingly minor aspects of the design of 
digital environments can shape individual actions and scale up to notable changes in collective 
behaviours. For instance, curtailing the number of times a message can be forwarded on 
WhatsApp (thereby slowing large cascades of messages) may have been a successful response to 75 
the spread of misinformation in Brazil and India34.  
To a substantial degree, social media and search engines have taken on a role as 
intermediary gatekeepers between readers and publishers: Today, more than half (55%) of global 
Internet users turn to either social media or search engines to access news articles3. One 
implication of this seismic shift is that a small number of global corporations and Silicon Valley 80 
CEOs have significant responsibility for curating the general population’s information35—and, 
by implication, for interpreting and protecting civic freedoms. The flow of information depends 
on corporations’ willingness and ability to self-regulate the industry. Facebook’s recent decision 
to declare politicians and their ads off-limits to their third-party fact checkers illustrate how 
corporate decisions can affect citizens’ information ecology and the interpretation of 85 
fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech. This situation, in which political content and 
news diets are curated by opaque and largely unaccountable third parties, is considered 
unacceptable by a majority of the public36,37, who continue to be concerned about their ability to 
discern online what is true and what is false3 and rate accuracy a very important attribute for 
social media sharing38.   90 
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How can citizens and democratic governments be empowered39 to create an ecosystem 
that “values and promotes truth” (p. 1096)15? The answers must be informed by independent 100 
behavioural research, which can then form the basis both for improved self-regulation by the 
relevant companies and for government regulation40,41. Regulators in particular face three serious 
problems in the online domain that underscore the importance of enlisting the behavioural 
sciences. The first problem is that online platforms can leverage their proprietary knowledge of 
user behaviour to defang regulations. An example comes from most of the current consent forms 105 
under the EU General Data Protection Regulation: Instead of obtaining genuinely informed 
consent, the current dialogue boxes influence people’s decision-making through self-serving 
forms of choice architecture (e.g., consent is assumed from pre-ticked boxes or inactivity)42,43. 
This example highlights the need for industry-independent behavioural research in order to 
ensure transparency for the user and to avoid opportunistic responses by those who are regulated. 110 
The second problem is that the speed and adaptability of technology and its users exceed that of 
regulation directly targeting online content. If uninformed by behavioural science, any regulation 
that focuses only on the symptoms and not on the actual human-platform interaction could be 
quickly circumvented by users and platforms. The third problem is the risk of censorship 
inherent in regulations that target content; behavioural sciences can reduce that risk as well. 115 
Rather than deleting or flagging posts based on judgements about their content, we focus here on 
how to redesign digital environments so as to provide a better sense of context and to encourage 
and empower people to make critical decisions for themselves 44,45,46. 
Our aim is to enlist two streams of research that illustrate the promise of behavioural 
sciences. The first examines the informational cues that are available online32 and asks which can 120 
help users gauge the epistemic quality of content or the trustworthiness of the social context from 
which it originated. The second stream concerns the use of meaningful and predictive cues in 
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behavioural interventions. Interventions can take the form of nudging47, which alters the 
environment or choice architecture so as to draw users’ attention to these cues, or boosting48, 
which teaches users to search for them on their own, thereby helping them become more resistant 
to false information and manipulation in the long run. 
Digital Cues and Behavioural Interventions for Human-Centred Online Environments 135 
The online world has the potential to provide digital cues that can help people assess the 
epistemic quality of content49,50,51—the potential of self-contained units of information (here we 
focus on online articles and social media posts) to contribute to true beliefs, knowledge, and 
understanding—and the public’s attitudes to societal issues52,53. We classify those cues as 
endogenous or exogenous54. 140 
Endogenous cues refer to the content itself, like the plot or the actors and their relations. 
Modern search engines use natural language-processing tools that analyse content55. They have 
considerable virtues and promise, but current results rarely afford nuanced interpretations56. For 
example, these methods cannot reliably distinguish between facts and opinions, nor can they 
detect irony, humour, or sarcasm57. They also have difficulty differentiating between extremist 145 
content and counterextremist messages58 because both types of messages tend to be tagged with 
similar keywords. A more general shortcoming of current endogenous cues of epistemic quality 
is that their evaluation requires background knowledge of the issue in question, which often 
makes them non-transparent and potentially prone to abuse for censorship purposes. 
By contrast, exogenous cues are easier to harness as indicators of epistemic quality: They 150 
refer to the context of information rather than the content, are relatively easy to quantify, and can 
be interpreted intuitively. A famous example of the use of exogenous cues is Google’s PageRank 




higher up in search results, irrespective of their content. Exogenous cues can indicate how well a 
piece of information is embedded in existing knowledge or the public discourse. 155 
From here on we focus on exogenous cues and how they can be enlisted by nudging47 and 
boosting48. Let us emphasize that a single measure will not reach everyone in a heterogeneous 
population with diverse motives and behaviours. We therefore propose a range of measures that 
differ in their scope and in the level of user engagement required. Nudging interventions shape 
behaviour primarily through the design of choice architectures and typically require little active 160 
user engagement. Boosting interventions, in contrast, focus on creating and promoting cognitive 
and motivational competences, either by directly targeting competences as external tools or 
indirectly by enlisting the choice environment. They require some level of user engagement and 
motivation. Both nudging and boosting have been shown to be effective in various domains, 
including health59,60 and finances61. Recent empirical results from research on people’s ability to 165 
detect false news indicate that informational literacy can also be boosted62. Initial results on the 
effectiveness of simple nudging interventions that remind people to think about accuracy before 
sharing content38 also suggest that interventions based on behavioural sciences could be effective 
in the online domain64. While empirical tests and evidence are urgently needed, the first step is to 
outline the conceptual space of possible interventions and make specific proposals. 170 
 Table 1 examines three online contexts: articles from newspapers or blogs, algorithmic 
curation systems that automatically suggest products or information (e.g., search engines or 
algorithmic curation of news feeds), and social media that display information about the 
behaviour of others (e.g., shared posts or social reactions such as comments or “likes”). Each is 
associated with a unique set of challenges, cues, and potential interventions. Next, we review the 175 
challenges and cues in Table 1, and detail some interventions in the subsequent sections.   
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Table 1. Overview of challenges, cues, and potential targets of nudging and boosting 185 
interventions in three online contexts. 
Online Articles: Information Overload and Epistemic Cues. The capacity to transfer 
information online continues to increase exponentially (average annual growth rate: 28%)65. 
Content can be distributed more rapidly and reaches an audience faster66. This increasing pace 
has consequences. In 2013, a hashtag on Twitter remained in the top 50 most popular hashtags 190 
worldwide for an average of 17.5 hours; by 2016, a hashtag’s time in the limelight had dropped 
to 11.9 hours. The same declining half-life has been observed for Google queries and movie 
ticket sales67. This acceleration, arguably driven by the finite limits of attention available for the 
ever increasing quantity of topics and content68 combined with an apparent thirst for novelty has 
significant but underappreciated psychological consequences. Information overload makes it 195 
harder for people to make good decisions about what to look at, spend time on, believe, and 
share69,70. For instance, longer-term offline decisions such as choosing a newspaper subscription 
(that then constrains one’s information diet) have evolved into a multitude of online micro-














sources crowd the market, the less attention can be allocated to each piece of content, and the 210 
more difficult it becomes to assess their trustworthiness— even more so given the demise and 
erosion of classic indicators of quality71 (e.g., name recognition, reputation, print quality, price). 
Going beyond them, new cues for epistemic quality that are readily accessible even under 
information overload are necessary. Exogenous cues can highlight the epistemic quality of 
individual articles, in particular by showing how an article is embedded in the existing corpus of 215 
knowledge and public discourse. These cues include, for instance, a newspaper article’s sources 
and citation network (i.e., sources that cite the article or are cited by it), references to established 
concepts and topical empirical evidence, and even the objectivity of the language. 
Algorithmic Curation: Asymmetry of Knowledge and Transparency. To help users 
navigate the overabundance of information, search engines automatically order results72,73 and 220 
recommender systems74 guide users to content they are likely to prefer75. But this convenience 
exacts a price. Because user satisfaction is not necessarily in line with the goals of algorithms—
to maximize user engagement and screen time76—algorithmic curation often deprives users of 
autonomy. For instance, feedback loops are created that can artificially re-enforce preferences 
77,78,79,80, and recommender systems can eliminate context in order to avoid overburdening users. 225 
To stay up to date and engaging, algorithms can trade recency for importance81 and, by 
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Similarly, aggregated previous user selections make targeted commercial nudging—and 
even manipulation—possible83,84. For example, given just 300 Facebook “likes” from one 235 
person, a regression model can better predict that person’s personality traits than friends and 
family85. There are at least three dimensions of knowledge where platforms can far exceed 
individual human capabilities (Figure 1a): Data that reaches further back in time (e.g., years of 
location history on Google Maps), information about behaviour on a collective rather than an 
individual level (e.g., millions of Amazon customers with similar interests as an individual can 240 
be utilized to recommend further products to that person), and knowledge that is inferred from 
existing data using machine-learning methods (e.g. food preferences from movement patterns 
between restaurants). 
Moving further along these dimensions, it becomes more difficult for a user to 
comprehend the wealth and predictive potential of this knowledge. Automatic customization of 245 
online environments that is based on this knowledge can therefore be opaque and manipulative 
(Figure 1a). Recent surveys in the USA and Germany found that a majority of respondents 
consider such data-driven personalization of political content (61%), social media feeds (57%) 
and news diets (51%) unacceptable, whereas they are much more accepting of it when it pertains 
Figure 1. Challenges in automatically curated environments and on social media platforms. (a) Dimensions of 
knowledge that platforms can acquire with information technology, which make their recommendations 
continuously opaque and manipulative. (b) perceived group sizes versus the actual global sizes, from the 






to commercial content. To rebalance the relationship between algorithmic and human decision 
making and to allow for heterogenous preferences across different domains, a two-step process is 
required. First, steps should be taken toward the design and implementation of more transparent 
algorithms. They should offer cues that clearly represent the data types and the weighting that led 
to a system’s suggestion as well as offer information about the target audience. Second, users 255 
should be able to adapt these factors to their personal preferences in order to regain autonomy.  
Social Media: Network Effects and Social Cues. More than two thirds of all Internet 
users, around 3 billion people, actively use social media86. These platforms offer information 
about the behaviour of others (e.g., “likes” and emoticons)87 and new opportunities for 
interaction (e.g., follower relationships and comment sections). However, these signals and 260 
interactions are often one-dimensional, represent only a user’s immediate online neighbourhood, 
and do not distinguish between different types of connections88. These limitations can have 
drastic effects, such as dramatically changing a user’s perception of group sizes89,90 and giving 
rise to false-consensus effects (i.e., the majority opinion in an individual’s neighbourhood leads 
them to falsely believe it reflects the actual majority opinion; Figure 1b). When people associate 265 
with like-minded others from a globally dispersed online community, their self-selected social 
surroundings (known as a homophilic social network) and the low visibility of the global state of 
the network91,92 can create the illusion of broad support93 and reinforce opinions or even make 
them more extreme94,95. For instance, even if only a tiny fraction (e.g., one in a million) of the 
more than two billion Facebook users believe that the Earth is flat, they could still form an online 270 
community of thousands, thereby creating a shield of like-minded people against corrective 
efforts96,97,98,99. Although large social media platforms routinely aggregate information that 
would foster a realistic assessment of societal attitudes, they currently do not provide a well-




others as asymmetrically positive—there typically is no “dislike” button—or biased toward 275 
narrow groups or highly active users101 in order to maximize user engagement. This need not be 
the case: The interactive nature of social media could be harnessed to promote diverse 
democratic dialogue and foster collective intelligence. In order to achieve this goal, social media 
needs to offer more meaningful, higher-dimensional cues that carry information about the 
broader state of the network rather than just the user’s direct neighbourhood, which can mitigate 280 
biased perceptions caused by the network structure102. For instance, social media platforms could 
provide a transparent crowd-sourced voting system103 or display informative metrics about the 
behaviour and reactions of others (e.g., including passive behaviour, like the total number of 
people who scrolled over a post), which might counter false-consensus effects.  
Nudging Interventions to Shape Online Environments  285 
Nudging interventions can alter choice architectures to promote the epistemic quality of 
information and its spread. One type of nudge, educative nudging, integrates epistemic cues into 
the choice environment primarily to inform behaviour (as opposed to actively steering it). For 
instance, highlighting when content stems from few or anonymous sources (as used by 
Figure 2 Nudging interventions that modify online environments. (a) Examples of exogenous cues and how they could appear 
alongside a social media post. (b) Example of a transparently organized news feed on social media. Types of content are clearly 







Wikipedia) can remind people to scrutinize content more thoroughly104,105 and simultaneously 
create an incentive structure for content producers to meet the required criteria. Such outlets can 
be made more transparent, for example by disclosing the identity of their confirmed owners. 
Similarly, pages that are run by state-controlled media might be labelled as such106. Going a step 295 
further, adding prominent hyperlinks to vetted reference sources for important concepts in a text 
could encourage a reader to gain context by perusing multiple sources—a strategy used by 
professional fact checkers107. 
Nudges can also communicate additional information about what others are doing, 
thereby invoking the steering power of descriptive social norms108: For instance, contextualizing 300 
the number of likes by expressing them against the absolute frequency of total readers (e.g., 
“4,287 out of 1.5 million readers liked this article”) might counteract false-consensus effects that 
a number presented without context (“4,287 people liked this article”) may otherwise engender. 
Transparent numerical formats have already been shown to successfully improve statistical 
literacy in the medical domain109. Similarly, displaying the total number of readers and their 305 
average reading time in relation to the potential total readership could help users evaluate the 
content’s epistemic quality: If only a tiny portion of the potential readership has actually read an 
article, whereas the majority spent less than a second on it, it might be clickbait. The presentation 
of many other cues, including ones that reach into the history of a piece of content, could be used 
to promote epistemic value on social media. Figure 2a shows a nudging intervention that 310 
integrates several exogenous cues into a social media news feed. 
 Similarly, users can be discouraged from sharing low-quality information without 
resorting to censorship by introducing “friction”—for instance, by making the act of sharing 





click in a pop-up warning message, alongside additional information about which of the above 
cues are missing or have critical values. 
Another type of nudge targets how content is arranged in browsers. The way a social 
media news feed sorts content is crucial in shaping how much attention is devoted to particular 
posts. Indeed, news feeds have become one of the most sophisticated algorithmically driven 320 
choice architectures of online platforms8,111. Transparent sorting algorithms for news feeds (such 
as the algorithm used by Reddit) that show the factors that determine how posts are sorted can 
help people understand why they see certain content; at the very least this nudging intervention 
would make the design of the feed’s architecture more transparent. Relatedly, platforms that 
clearly differentiate between types of content (e.g., ads, news, or posts by friends) can make 325 
news feeds more transparent and clearer (Figure 2b).  
Boosting interventions to foster user competences 
Figure 3 Illustrations of boosting interventions as they could appear within an online environment or as external tools. (a) 
Visualization of a sharing cascade. Alongside metrics, like the depth or the breadth of a cascades, a pop-up window on social 
media can provide a simple visualization of a sharing cascade that shows who (if the profile is public) and when others have 
shared content before it reached the user. (b) A fast-and-frugal decision tree as an example of a boosting intervention. A pop-
up or an external tool can show a fast-and-frugal decision tree alongside an online article, that helps to check criteria to 
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Boosting seeks to empower people in the longer term by helping them build the 
competences they need to navigate situations autonomously (for a conceptual map of boosting 
interventions online, see also112). These interventions can be integrated directly into the 
environment itself or be available in an app or browser add-on. Unlike many nudging 335 
interventions, boosting interventions will ideally remain effective even when they are no longer 
present in the environment because they have become routinized and have instilled a lasting 
competence in the user.  
The competence of acting as one’s own choice architect, or self-nudging, can be 
boosted113. For instance, when users can customize how their news feed is designed and sorted 340 
(Figure 2b), they can become their own choice architects and regain some informational 
autonomy. For instance, users could be enabled or encouraged to design information ecologies 
for themselves that are tailored toward high epistemic quality, making sources of low epistemic 
quality less accessible. Such boosting interventions would require changes to the online 
environment (e.g., transparent sorting algorithms or clear layouts; see previous section and 345 
Figure 2b) and the provision of epistemic cues.  
Another competence that could be boosted to help users deal more expertly with 
information they encounter online is the ability to make inferences about the reliability of 
information based on the social context from which it originates114. The structure and details of 
the entire cascade of individuals who have previously shared an article on social media has been 350 
shown to serve as proxies for epistemic quality115. Namely, the sharing cascade contains metrics 
such as the depth and breadth of dissemination by others, with deep and narrow cascades 
indicating extreme or niche topics and breadth indicating widely discussed issues116. A boosting 
intervention could provide this information (Figure 3a) to show the full history of a post, 





the process (showing, e.g., if the information is old news that has been repeatedly and artificially 
amplified). 
Yet another competence required for discerning between sources of high and low quality 
is the ability to read laterally107. Lateral reading is a skill developed by professional fact checkers 360 
that entails looking for information on sites other than the information source in order to evaluate 
its credibility (e.g., “who is behind this website?” and “what is the evidence for its claims?”) 
rather than evaluating a website’s credibility by using the information provided there. This 
competence can be boosted with simple decision aids such as fast-and-frugal decision trees117,118. 
Employed in a wide range of areas (e.g., medicine, finance, law, management), fast-and-frugal 365 
decision trees can guide the user to scrutinize relevant cues. For example, users can respond to 
prompts in a pop-up window (e.g., “Are references provided?”), with each answer leading either 
to an immediate decision (e.g., “unreliable”) or to the next cue until a final judgment about 
content reliability is reached (e.g., “reliable”; Figure 3b)119. Decision trees can also enhance the 
transparency of third-party decisions. If reliability is judged by third-party fact checkers or via an 370 
automated process, users could opt to see the decision tree and follow the path that led to the 
decision, thereby gaining insight that will be useful in the long-term. Eventually, fast-and-frugal 
decision trees may help people establish a habit of checking epistemic cues when reading content 
even in the absence of a pop-up window suggesting they do so48. 
Finally, the competence of understanding what makes intentionally false information so 375 
alluring (e.g., novelty and the element of surprise) can be boosted by mental inoculation 
techniques: Being informed about manipulative methods before encountering them online 
enables an individual to detect parasitic imitations of trustworthy sources and other sinister 
tactics120,121. Making people aware of such strategies or of their own personal vulnerabilities 
leaves them better able to identify and resist manipulation. For instance, having people take on 380 











the role of a malicious influencer in a computer game has been demonstrated to improve their 385 
ability to spot and resist misinformation62,122. This inoculation technique can be used in a range 
of contexts online; for example, learning about the target group of an advertisement can increase 
people’s ability to detect advertising strategies. 
Conclusion 
Any attempt to regulate or manage the digital world must begin with the understanding 390 
that online communication is already regulated— to some extent by public policy or laws, but 
primarily by search engines and recommender systems whose goals and parameters may not be 
publicly known, let alone be subject to public scrutiny. The current online environment has given 
rise to opaque and asymmetric relationships between users and platforms, and it is reasonable to 
question whether the industry will independently take action to foster an ecosystem that values 395 
and promotes truth. The interventions we propose are aimed primarily at empowering individuals 
to make informed and autonomous decisions in the online ecosystem—and, through their own 
behaviour, to foster and reinforce truth. The interventions are partly conceptualized on the basis 
of existing results. However, not all interventions have been tested in the specific context in 
which they may be deployed. Undoubtedly, therefore, these and other interventions are subject to 400 
further empirical test. The first results are promising, identifying some interventions as 
effective63,121 whereas others appear less promising123. Both set of results will inform the design 
of more effective interventions.  
In our view, the future task for scientists is to design interventions that meet at least three 
selection criteria: They must be transparent and trustworthy to the public, standardisable within 405 
certain categories of content, and, importantly, hard to game by bad-faith actors or vested 
interests. We also suggest that there is a need to examine a wide spectrum of interventions, from 
nudges to boosts, in order to reach different types of people, who have heterogeneous 











preferences, motivations and online behaviours. These interventions will not completely prevent 415 
manipulation or active dissemination of false information, but they will help users recognise 
when these malicious tactics are at work. They will also permit producers of quality information 
to differentiate themselves from less trustworthy sources. Behavioural interventions in the online 
ecology can not only inform government regulations, but also signal a platform’s commitment to 
truth, epistemic quality, and trustworthiness: Platforms can indicate their commitment to these 420 
values by providing their users with exogenous cues and boosting and nudging interventions, and 
users can choose to avoid platforms that do not offer them these features.  
For this dynamic to gain momentum it is not necessary that all or even the majority of 
users engage with nudging or boosting interventions; as the first Wikipedia contributors have 
proven, a critical mass may suffice to allow positive effects to scale up to major improvements. 425 
Such a dynamic may counteract a possible drawback of the proposed interventions; namely, 
widening information gaps between users if only empowered consumers are able to recognise 
quality information. Furthermore, it can help to mitigate gaps currently arising from the ability to 
pay for quality content. In the trade-off between offering interventions that not everybody will 
engage with and leaving citizen without any interventions that could cause differential 430 
competences and knowledge, we err on the side of empowerment.  
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